Joseph Tabbi, who has a chapter of his own in the volume, Pynchon in Context (Cambridge 2018), corrects two citational errors in this same volume. Both mischaracterize, by reading out of context a sentence in Tabbi's 1995 monograph, Postmodern Sublime (Cornell University Press). Because Tabbi's arguments are thought (wrongly) to support an "old argument" in Pynchon criticism, Tabbi brings this misreading to the attention of contemporary literature scholars, before the wrong impression becomes general knowledge. And from there, I go on to articulate precisely "the narrative design and its distinct differences" that Coale is asking for:
It may be impossible, it is true, to separate the restrictive forms within the technology of control from Pynchon's own activity as a form-maker in fiction; but this does not lessen the power of Pynchon's resistance, at least not in Gravity's Rainbow. Pynchon is doubtless aware of the limits to all merely formal arrangements, but he depends on the existence of such limits in order to create a sense of freedom at the point where they break down or, better yet, at the point where two or more separate rational systems come into conflict with each other, creating the spiritual equivalent of worlds intersecting. So far from representing an awareness of his own rational systems, Pynchon accentuates their limits in order to extend their signifying power beyond themselves, into a noumenal world "between" powers, and perhaps even beyond the precincts of the controlling imagination.
Postmodern Sublime (page 92; emphasis in the original) My own sense, re-reading this chapter, is that I actually anticipated some of the current, compelling arguments in the Cambridge collection, for example: Gilles 
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